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Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the banking crisis in the US and Western 
Europe that began in August 2007 spilled over to the currencies the EU-8 such that it 
could be viewed as financial contagion. The currencies of the EU-8 that will be 
studied are of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and 
Slovakia, daily, from 2005 to 2008.  
 
Design/Methodology 
Contagion is said to be revealed if there are greater links after August 2007 compared 
with before. The links or bonds are revealed by the number of cointegrating vectors 
and the extent of Granger-causality that exists among the currencies. The role of the 
Euro is also identified using the same techniques. 
 
Findings 
The bonds between these seven countries strengthen after the beginning of the 
banking crisis compared with before, whilst the ties with the Euro remains stable.  
 
Research limitations/implications 
A banking crisis not directly related to the EU-8 spilled over to a change in the 
correlations among their currencies. If the EU requires convergence of emerging with 
developed markets before currency assimilation, research is needed to explore how a 
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record of financial rectitude can be demonstrated whilst recognising that contagion is 
more likely to affect those emerging markets and information deficiencies.   
 
Practical Implications 
First, the EU should reconsider the entry requirements for the EU-8 still disqualified 
from joining the Euro. The protected 2 year period of displaying financial rectitude 
via targeting the Euro before accession is considered may now appear a burden that to 
great for small economies to bear. Second, it is not necessarily a crisis that changes 
the rewards from diversification, contagion may also do this. 
 
Originality/value 
The finding of increased bonding among emerging market currencies precipitated by 
a banking crisis in related geographical and financial markets, before a local crisis 
became evident is novel.  
 
Key words Contagion, EU-8, Foreign Exchange Rates, Cointegration, Granger-
causality 
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Introduction 
Modern portfolio theory advocates that investors should manage risk through 
diversification across a variety of assets (Cuthbertson, 1996). Dispersing investments 
across two assets that are not perfectly correlated should reduce risk exposure. 
Diversification in asset types is based on the view that each is a function of a 
distinctive group of variables (Hoesli et al., 1997). So, for example, diversification in 
property types is based on the presumption that each is a function of a distinctive 
group of variables: business services drive office rents; industrial performance affects 
industrial rents; and consumer demand influences retail rents. Thus, the market 
drivers should be different.  
The credit crunch/banking crisis of 2007/8 entailed excessive lending in the 
US sub-prime market plus the marketing and miss-rating of complex debt instruments 
by western financial institutions. The timeline of events in the credit crisis (Bank of 
England, 2008) shows evidence of some financial distress, particularly relating to 
Bear Sterns, but the key announcement made on 9 8 07 of BNP Paribus suspending 
three sub-prime money market funds and the European Central Bank injecting €95bn 
to boost liquidity in the banking sector was the marker of a change. The London 
interbank lending system essentially fails to operate from this time on, precipitating, 
within a month, the first run on a British bank for over a century. This crisis might 
have spilled over to other markets not directly affected, altering the basis for portfolio 
diversification among these markets, including emergent European markets. 
 The aim of this paper is to examine whether the banking crisis in the US and 
Western Europe, that began in August 2007, spilled over to the currencies the EU-8 
such that it could be viewed as financial contagion. The structure of the paper is as 
follows. In the first section, there is a review of literature concerning emerging 
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markets and financial contagion over numerous crises. This is followed by an outline 
of theoretical perspectives on contagion and then a review of the background or 
setting of the study, including hypotheses. The data and the methodology are then 
reviewed. The results reveal that there has been a strengthening of links among the 
EU-8 both in the long and short runs, whilst the bond with the Euro remains. It is 
concluded that financial contagion occurred from developed economy markets 
directly related to the crisis to emerging markets before a currency crisis hit one of the 
EU-8. 
 
Emerging Markets and Contagion 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) suggest a financial crisis is usually related to a currency, a 
stock market or a banking crisis. Financial assts used in this regard includes bonds 
(e.g. Yang, 2005) currencies (e.g. AuYong et al., 2004) and stock markets (e.g. 
Gilmore and McManus, 2002; Syriopoulos, 2007). Gilmore and McManus (2002) 
explore whether emerging equity markets of markets of Central Europe are segmented 
from the US and, hence, provide scope for diversification. They undertake Granger-
causality and cointegration tests. As they find no cointegration and only one case of 
Granger-causality, they conclude that diversification is appropriate. 
 In their study of Central European stock markets, Serwa and Bohl  
(2005) point out that very few empirical studies have concentrated on contagion 
among these markets. The Russian crisis of 1998/9 led to increased correlations 
across Central European stock markets during the 1994–1999 period (Gelos and 
Sahay, 2001) with market sentiment being a conduit (Darvas and Szapáry, 2000). 
  Serwa and Bohl (2005) use the same approach as Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
and Gelos and Sahay (2001) in examining the co-movement of stock index returns by 
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cross-market correlation. They find that Central European stock markets are no more 
likely to be subject to contagion than western stock markets over the 1997-2002 
period. The Central European stock markets exhibit interdependence rather than 
contagion. 
 
Split Sample Analysis using Cointegration and Granger-causality 
Whilst exploring integration among eleven European and US stock markets, Yang et 
al. (2003) find that the establishing of European monetary union affected the 
integration of both EMU and non-EMU markets. This is an example of a study that 
entails splitting the data into before and after an event to examine whether the event 
left a mark upon the degree of integration among a number of financial markets. An 
approach to the investigation of shock analysis/ contagion and integration involves the 
use of cointegration with Granger-causality.  
Using stock market indices of emerging Central European and developed 
stock markets, as with Gilmore and McManus, Syriopoulos (2007), examines 
financial market links. He finds that they seem to be more strongly linked to the 
markets of the US and Germany as a result of membership of the EU. To achieve this, 
he considers the stock markets of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, 
in the two years prior three, and three quarters, after the establishment of EMU on the 
First of January 99. Stock market interdependence is based on testing for 
cointegration and the number of vectors, analysing the relevant ECM, and considering 
the speed of adjustment: greater interdependence is reflected in the number of vectors. 
In contrast with Gilmore and McManus, he finds that there is one cointegrating vector 
among the six indices for both before and after EMU. This includes the US S&P500 
and the German Dax. Finding that both the developed economy indices had non-zero 
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loadings in the long run vector, Syriopoulos concludes that they both have a dominant 
influence on the emerging markets, which is line with Yang et al.. Although, the 
finding of one vector in both periods suggests that there is no strengthening of links, it 
does indicate that portfolio diversification is less effective and that immunity to 
external shocks is limited by a long run relationship with other markets.  
The Granger-causality results for both the pre and post eras again suggest that 
both the developed-economy indices have a dominant influence on the emerging 
markets. The post EMU period is characterised by weaker short run links among the 
emerging markets, with Slovakia, in particular, following a more autonomous path.  
Also exploring the impact of an event, AuYong et al. (2004) examine 
contagion among foreign exchange markets of emerging and Asian economies. The 
data, which is daily 14 countries’ foreign exchange rates against the US Dollar from 
1994 to 2001, is divided into seven sub-samples. Each series is assessed in each sub-
period for pairwise and multiple cointegration. The pairwise cointegration results 
suggest major economies (Japan) and those close together Indonesia and Thailand) 
are cointegrated throughout, suggesting trade and proximity are important factors in 
contagion. 
Arranging the 14 currencies into four groups, AuYong et al. show how the 
degree of integration, as measured by the number of cointegrating vectors, varies. For 
example, the Asian currencies are cointegrated before the Mexican crisis of 1994/5 
but are not found to be cointegrated again until the Russian crisis of 1998/9.  
The Granger-causality tests also revealed instability in linkages. During the 
crisis in that area, causality was found between countries with weak trading links and 
at a great distance from the Asian region. This may suggest relationships that can be 
related to the contagion rather than interaction that would provoke normal co-
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movements. Given the level of inter and intra regional interaction indicated by either 
Granger-causality or cointegration, AuYong et al. suggest diversification on an 
international basis may be undermined particularly when they find that (real) trade 
links do not adequately explain causality relationships.   
Masih and Masih (1997, 2004) examine the impact of the stock exchange 
crash of October 1987. They find cointegration among six major stock markets (1997) 
and the five monthly European stock market indices (2004) both before and after the 
crisis. They find only one vector in each period. In the 2004 paper, oddly, 
cointegration is not found across the entire period but this is not investigated in the 
1997 paper. Also in the 1997 paper, vector loadings are investigated. Only the French 
index appears to have a zero loading in the long run vector.  
The Granger-causality results suggest that most links were altered. In the 1997 
paper there were no significant links before the crash, which conflicts with the 2004 
paper. Only the bond between Germany causing France was consistent across both 
eras in the 2004 paper. Thus, the crash is found to have altered the bonds between 
many markets. 
 
Financial Crises and Contagion 
In their review of contagious financial events, Kaminsky et al. (2003) highlight three 
common themes: first, an abrupt reversal of capital flows; second, an unanticipated 
announcement that sets off a readjustment of portfolios; and third, leveraged common 
creditors, such as commercial banks, help propagate the crisis across national borders. 
All three appear evident in the credit crunch of 2007.  
Kaminsky et al. (2003) identify three groups of theories to explain contagion. 
The first, herding, concerns an information-cascade, where individuals observe the 
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behaviour of those ‘in front of them’ and, without regard to their own information, 
follow that. Indeed, where investors in portfolios face information asymmetries, the 
costs of correcting these may outweigh the benefits, so herding is rational. Mimicking 
the market portfolio is a prediction of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, so if other 
investors are divesting themselves of a country specific investment, so should you. 
 The second, trade linkages, can be seen in a regional system of countries in a 
fixed exchange rate system with strong trade linkages among sub-group and one of 
these devalues. The change in relative prices will put pressure on others in the sub-
group to follow suit, such as the Portuguese Escudo devalued with the Spanish Peseta 
during the ERM crisis of 1992. 
 The third explanation of contagion is financial linkages. Rational investors 
with non-performing assets in country-diversified portfolio may rebalance it by 
selling assets. As the assets that will be sold are unlikely to be the country where asset 
prices have collapse, the rebalancing will depress asset prices in other countries. 
Banks play an important role in this process as they call in loans in markets that are, 
as yet, unaffected by the contagion, in an effort to shore-up positions in their home 
market.  
 Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) present five definitions of contagions; the fifth, 
(shift) contagion, is relevant for the approach taken here. Shift contagion entails an 
intensification or change in the transmission of shocks between markets. This is a 
variant on the third and fourth definitions, which relate to an intensification of the co-
movement of assets across markets. Shift contagion implies a structural break and the 
identification of a tranquil, pre-event period. The key concern about contagion is that 
it undermines the very assumptions of portfolio analysis. Markets that were assumed 
(estimated to be) weakly associated before the event are subsequently found to be 
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strongly associated, so that diversification across these markets fails to shield the 
investor from unsystematic risk. 
 
A Macroeconomic Perspective  
As a group in 2006, the EU-8 had relatively low rates of household debt to income. 
However, the period from 2000-2006 had seen a high rate of growth of credit in 
Latvia and Estonia compared with the others whereas in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic it had fallen. Moreover, the external debt of banks and enterprises in Latvia 
and Estonia was also out of line with the others. But this difference may reflect macro 
targets. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia pursue variants of 
inflation targeting, whereas Latvia targets exchange rate stability.  
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia were members of the Central 
European Free Trade Area until 2004, which should foster relatively strong trading 
bonds. In an exercise to examine financial stability in Europe and a single market in 
banking, Garcia and Nieto (2007) estimate cross border bank asset holdings in the 
European Economic Area. They find that the large western economies generally hold 
a low level – certainly less than 25%. By contrast, of EU-8 analysed, the lowest 
proportion is just below 60% and Estonia is estimated at 100%. Clearly, the scope for 
financial contagion is greater in the EU-8 as a result. Moreover, Lithuania and Estonia 
in 2004 and Latvia and Slovakia in 2005 joined the so-called ERM11, the precursor to 
joining the Euro. In a speech given by Otmar Issing, Member of the Executive Board 
of the ECB, in April 2005 suggested that ERM11, by requiring the adoption of a 
consistent monetary and economic policy framework, fosters policy discipline 
towards stability. It can help establish a stable macroeconomic environment and can 
act as a catalyst of structural reforms. Second, it can enhance policy credibility and 
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help guide expectations. The central parity of a currency against the Euro provides 
guidance to foreign exchange markets and should contribute to greater exchange rate 
stability. Furthermore, this should constrain inflationary expectations, accelerating 
disinflation and reduce inflation volatility. ERM11 should foster another link among 
the currencies. 
 Daianu and Lungu (2007) review the impact of inflation targeting on the 
Central European economies of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and 
the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. The cost of accession to the EU in 
2004 has, Daianu and Lungu argue, pushed up inflation. Karam et al. (2008) might 
argue that this is a price worth paying, as smaller states are subject to more volatility 
than larger ones. The problems of conflicting government goals and uncertainty about 
the future making forecasting [and hence targeting] inflation challenging could breed 
uncertainty among speculators. This would undermine confidence in the central bank 
(Daianu and Lungu, 2007). Indeed, targeting both low inflation and exchange rate 
stability (as part of ERM11) implies a conflict of goals if the same instrument is used. 
One would anticipate that, among the group, there would be at least one 
cointegrating vector, possibly, given the extent of the common borders and history, 
there would be more. Moreover, given the banking linkages, bonds with Europe and 
the accession to the Euro criteria, there is likely to be some contagion leading to more 
bonding as measured by cointegration and Granger-causality after the [news] event of 
9 8 08. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the foreign exchange rates (FX rates) are 
led, in the long run (Jones and Leishman) and short run (Granger-causality sense), by 
the Euro.  
Data for the Czech Koruna, Estonian Kroon, Hungarian Forint, Lithuanian 
Litas, Latvian Lats, Polish Zloty, Slovakian Koruna and Euro, all measured in US 
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Dollars, is taken from the Bank of England’s statistics website for the period 15 7 05 
to 28 10 08. This covers 835 daily FX rates, with the break occurring at 9 8 07. Plots 
of the logged series (unlabelled) are displayed in Figure 1. There may be a slow drift 
downwards in the levels of the data but this may not be significant. In generally, the 
lower two (Czech Koruna and Estonian Kroon) appear almost flat, whilst the rest 
appear to drift very much in line. 
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Figure 1 Exchange Rates vs US Dollar  
 
The autocorrelation functions (ACF) of the exchange rate data are considered. All 
exhibit a slow decline in the ACF pattern and a single spike at lag 1 on the Partial 
ACF of around 1, indicative of unit root. The data is differenced and the ACFs are re-
estimated. The results of this exercise, displayed in Table 1, show a common spike at 
lag 4, implying a periodicy of 4 days. Despite this, a Box-Ljung test (with 4 lags) 
indicates that the Latvian Lats and the Slovak Koruna follow random walks. 
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Table 1 Autocorrelation Function Coefficients of the Data Differenced 
Lag Czech Estonia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Poland Slovakia Euro 
1 .011 .009 .064 .009 .003 .093 .032 .008 
2 .068 .058 -.007 .058 .055 .109 .039 .059 
3 .023 .029 .067 .029 .035 .031 .012 .029 
4 .118 .089 .159 .088 .076 .141 .079 .088 
5 .012 -.009 .057 -.008 -.012 .025 -.014 -.009 
6 -.003 -.006 -.076 -.006 -.010 -.051 -.023 -.006 
7 .015 -.040 .065 -.040 -.033 -.001 -.005 -.040 
8 .017 .005 .057 .004 .009 .065 .040 .004 
9 -.038 -.043 -.023 -.043 -.043 -.024 -.015 -.042 
10 -.036 -.028 -.007 -.028 -.017 .014 -.025 -.028 
11 -.018 .016 .035 .016 .023 -.040 .006 .016 
12 .089 .037 .092 .037 .046 .100 .055 .037 
13 .035 .035 .043 .035 .045 .028 .071 .035 
14 .025 .066 .031 .066 .065 .025 .035 .067 
15 .070 .072 .061 .072 .065 .070 .017 .072 
16 .005 -.025 -.036 -.026 -.020 .007 -.024 -.026 
Critical Value 0.07 
 
Using the Akaike lag selection criterion, the data from the eight FX rate series will be 
considered for unit roots. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test involves the 
expression, 
tjt
p
j
jtt xtxx 1
1
11110 )1( εαβρα +Δ++−+=Δ −
=
− ∑  
where  p is the order of the lag polynomial, ε1t ~ iid(0, σε²) and t is a time trend. The 
unit root test results for the eight currencies used subdivided by the two sub periods 
are reported in Table 2. The lag order (p) = 0 unless indicated. The results are for an 
ADF with a linear trend (critical value –3.4175) and without a linear trend (critical 
value –2.8654). The unit root tests suggest that all the series are difference-stationary. 
Given the discussion above the results entailing the intercept but no trend are more 
likely to reflect the data generating mechanism. 
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Table 2 Unit Root Test Results 
 Before Aug 2007 After Aug 2007 
 a b a b 
Czech -1.1512 -2.9758 -1.4503 (4) 1.3986 
Estonia -.72230 -3.0272 -.18490 (4) 1.6434 
Hungary -.69179 -1.9306 -.27336 (7) 1.7436 (7) 
Lithuania -.72207 -3.0265 -.43831 (4) 1.6438 
Latvia -.76062 -3.0103 -.15072 (4) 1.7467 
Poland -1.1586 -3.3366 (1) -.68712 (4) 2.3436 (6) 
Slovakia -.11696 -2.5055 -1.2509 (4) 1.6214 
Euro -.72156 -3.0275 -.43793 (4) 1.6450 
a intercept but not a trend  b an intercept and a linear trend  
Lag(0) unless indicated 
 
Analytical Approach 
The non-stationary data is tested for cointegration using the Johansen (1988) method. 
The Johansen approach is based on full information maximum likelihood estimation 
and is primarily applied to I(1) data. Let xt be an n × 1 vector, with a pth order vector 
error correction (VECM) format expressed as, 
Δxt =  μ + Δx t−j + Πxt−p +et ,  et ~ iid (0, Ωe), Φ j
j
p
=1
1−∑
where μ is a vector of constants, xt vector of the n  FX rate variables, et is vector of 
residuals and Φ and Π are n × n matrices of parameters. The long-term relationship 
parameter matrix, Π is assessed for its rank. If the rank of Π = r, where 0 < r < n, then 
some or all the variables in xt are cointegrated with r cointegrating vectors. Defining 
Π = αβ', where both α and β are n × r matrices, the columns of β form r distinct 
cointegrating vectors and α, the corresponding weights. The Johansen estimation 
procedure offers two options for testing the number of cointegrating relations. The 
one used here, known as the Trace test, entails the likelihood ratio  
)ˆ1(
1
∑
+=
−−=
n
rj
jtrace lnT λλ   (Johansen, 1995 p.93). 
The Trace test is preferred to the alternative, the Maximal Eigenvalue, as it is more 
robust to both residual skewness and kurtosis (Cheung and Lai, 1993). Silvapulle and 
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Podivinsky (2000) report that, when using Johansen’s technique, researchers should 
not be overly concerned by small departures from normality, even in finite samples. 
They examine the impact of skew and leptokurtic errors and find they represent a mild 
problem. They also report that tests for restrictions on cointegrating vector values 
appear to be robust to both problem areas.  
 
The Number of Cointegrating Vectors 
The Johansen MLE can produce as many as n – 1 cointegrating vectors from n 
variables. Dickey et al. (1991) suggest that each vector represents a constraint on a 
system of variables, restricting their deviations from the long-run relationship to be 
within certain boundaries. The greater the number of cointegrating relations, the more 
stable the model.  
As a cointegrating vector is a stationary linear combination of non-stationary 
variables it is possible for a sub-set to be stationary. Davidson (2000) argues that a 
cointegrating relation with k (< n − 1) variables may be reducible, implying a sub-set 
of k − j variables may be cointegrated. A cointegrating relation with k variables is 
only irreducible if dropping any one of them leaves the set not cointegrated. Thus, “it 
is legitimate to check for cointegrating relationships in sub-sets.” (Dickey and 
Rossana, 1994, p.342). This translates in to, with r cointegrating vectors among the n 
FX rates from Central Europe, the series are closely bonded with r = n − 1 and 
weakly bonded if r = 1 and not bonded in the long run if r = 0. Jones and Leishman 
(2006) go one step further revealing a leading housing region by considering whether 
the addition of that region to a group of others that are cointegrated results in an 
increase in the number of cointegrating vectors. This translates in to, with r 
cointegrating vectors among the n FX rates from Central Europe, where n > r > 0, if it 
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is a leading currency in the Jones and Leishman sense, the addition of the Euro to this 
group should be associated with r + 1 vectors from n + 1 currencies. 
 
Granger-causality 
In an n-dimensional multivariate vector error correction model of lag order (p) 
(VECM(p)) for lnFX1, the logged foreign exchange rate for country 1, can be 
represented as 
tpjt
r
j
j
p
j
jntnjjt
p
j
jjt
p
j
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1
1
1
1
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where 
zjt = μ1 + βj1 lnFX1t + βj2 lnFX2t + βj3 lnFX3t + … + βjn lnFXnt  
e1t ~ iid (0, σ1e²), 
μ1 is the intercept capturing rate of drift or is the mean of the levels of the 
data. 
 
Changes in currency market 2 are said to Granger-causality changes in currency 
market 1 if φ2j ≠ 0 for all j, with the possibility of Granger-causality in both directions 
(feedback). Granger-causality and cointegration have been used to identify unified 
spatially-distinct markets and to delineate leading markets/ spillover/ contagion. 
Finding they are difference stationary suggests the FX rate series could be 
cointegrated. Using an Akaike lag selection criterion, a lag length of four for pre and 
post event structures is used. Two formats are considered for the VECM; the intercept 
could be in the long run relations or in the short run expression. The results for the 
number of cointegrating vectors and Granger-causality were almost identical but the 
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constant in the short run relations was found to be zero in all cases, whereas the 
intercept in the long was found to be different from zero (see Table 4).  
 
Cointegration 
The cointegration results for the pre and post August 2007 periods are reported in 
Table 3. In the period up to the crisis the group of seven currencies exhibit one 
cointegrating vector at the 5% level. Thus, there is a long run relation among the 
group. As the period considered does not involve a currency crisis, it will be assumed 
that this reveals normal currency relations. There is only a weak link between them 
but the follow common trends. In the period after August 2007, the period after the 
western banking crisis began to unfurl, the group of seven currencies exhibit two 
cointegrating vectors. Thus, in the crisis period, the bonds between the currencies 
appear to have increased. On this measure, there appears to be evidence of shift 
contagion in the fifth definition sense of Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). 
 
Table 3 Cointegration Test Results  
Hypothesis Trace Statistic 
 
Critical 
Value  
Null Alt. Before Aug 
07 
After Aug 
07 
95% 90% 
r = 0 r ≥ 1 170.8125* 199.4739* 132.45  127.24  
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 72.8146 107.3032* 102.56  97.87  
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 47.3969 56.7754 75.98  71.81  
r ≤ 3 r ≥ 4 29.8898 33.6794 53.48  49.95  
r ≤ 4 r ≥ 5 15.5490 19.9048 34.87  31.93  
r ≤ 5 r ≥ 6 7.0134 10.0085 20.18  17.88  
r ≤ 6 r ≥ 7 2.1309 4.1934 9.16  7.53  
* significant at the 5% level 
 
Factor Loadings 
Next, there is a consideration of the factor loading in the cointegrating vector(s). The 
null that the factor loading for currency j is zero is not rejected in the cases of Czech 
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Koruna, Hungarian Forint, Latvian Lats, Polish Zloty and Slovakian Koruna in the pre 
August period. Indeed, the test results in Table 4 indicate two of the Baltic States 
appear cointegrated only. This suggests that these currencies are weakly bound at 
best.  
 By contrast the post-August considerations paint a different picture. Only the 
Slovakian Koruna appears to have a zero weighting. Thus, there again appears to be a 
significant change in the level of interaction among the currencies of Central Europe. 
Again, on this measure, there appears to be evidence of shift contagion. 
 
Table 4 Tests for Zero Loadings 
 Before Aug 
2007 
After Aug 
2007 
Czech 1.2502[.264] 17.8387[.000]** 
Estonia 72.5458[.000]** 68.8259[.000]** 
Hungary 1.2260[.268] 28.2844[.000]** 
Lithuania 72.5415[.000]**  68.8029[.000]** 
Latvia .062087[.803] 7.9128[.019]* 
Poland .55444[.457]  23.2970[.000] ** 
Slovakia 2.9708[.085]  3.1801[.204] 
Intercept 72.5518[.000]**  68.8309[.000]**  
 
Granger-causality 
The short run links are revealed by Granger-causality tests based on the Vector Error 
Correction Models. The models, in general, exhibit errors that are independent over 
time. Where heteroscedasticity was evident, a Newey-West adjustment was made 
entailing 14 lags. As one might anticipate, this was needed more for the post than the 
pre August 2007 period. The errors appear leptokurtic, which is common in financial 
data and Silvapulle and Podivinsky (2000) view this as a minor problem.  
 The Wald tests, displayed in Table 5 for the period before the crisis, suggest 
that there were no short run links among the Central European currencies. By 
contrast, the Granger-causality test show, in Table 6, that Poland exhibits a leading 
role in short run currency changes. The test results may also point to a secondary 
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effect through Hungary. Moreover, Latvian Lats leads the Slovakian Koruna and 
feeds-back with the Hungarian Forint. Overall, evidence suggests no currency is 
independent of all others in the post August 2007 period. Yet again, on this measure, 
there appears to be evidence of shift contagion in the fifth definition sense of Pericoli 
and Sbracia (2003). 
  
Table 5 Granger-causality Test Results Before August 2007 
 Czech Estonia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Poland Slovakia 
Czech  1.8539 [.603] 
1.6908 
[.639] 
1.8489 
[.604] 
2.8452 
[.416] 
2.9254 
[.403] 
2.9527 
[.399] 
Estonia 1.2044 [.752] 
 2.2688 
[.519] 
1.0096 
[.799] 
.94050 
[.816] 
.49685 
[.920] 
2.8030 
[.423] 
Hungary .78230 [.854] 
.88191 
[.830] 
 .88164 
[.830] 
1.1665 
[.761] 
1.4176 
[.701] 
2.1412 
[.544] 
Lithuania 1.2248 [.747] 
1.0707 
[.784] 
2.2530 
[.522] 
 .98893 
[.804] 
.56249 
[.905] 
2.9046 
[.407] 
Latvia 1.3820 [.710] 
2.8198 
[.420] 
1.0188 
[.797] 
2.8340 
[.418] 
 1.0966 
[.778] 
4.8385 
[.184] 
Poland 1.4911 [.684] 
3.2083 
[.361] 
.52402 
[.914] 
3.2005 
[.362] 
3.7684 
[.288] 
 4.4050 
[.221] 
Slovakia .43537 [.933] 
.60089 
[.896] 
.88433 
[.829] 
.59335 
[.898] 
.69252 
[.875] 
.97703 
[.807] 
 
 
Table 6 Granger-causality Test Results After August 2007 
 Czech Estonia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Poland Slovakia 
Czech  2.7313 [.435] 
4.0821 
[.253] 
2.7753 
[.428] 
2.8212 
[.420] 
1.7559 
[.625] 
.88978 
[.828] 
Estonia 1.0834 [.781] 
 1.0094 
[.799] 
1.5713 
[.666] 
1.2790 
[.734] 
2.2536 
[.521] 
3.4446 
[.328] 
Hungary 15.8094 [.001]** 
7.9671 
[.047]* 
 7.9879 
[.046]* 
8.4145 
[.038]* 
3.1606 
[.368] 
8.5535 
[.036]* 
Lithuania 1.0378 [.792] 
1.5872 
[.662] 
.94656 
[.814] 
 1.3467 
[.718] 
2.1941 
[.533] 
3.4470 
[.328] 
Latvia 2.2096 [.530] 
5.3731 
[.146] 
9.0821 
[.028]* 
5.3359 
[.149] 
 7.8126 
[.050] 
8.8606 
[.031]* 
Poland 10.6085 [.014]* 
12.9904 
[.005]** 
24.0237 
[.000]** 
12.9300 
[.005]** 
12.4727 
[.006]** 
 9.3072 
[.025]* 
Slovakia 1.0070 [.800] 
2.4606 
[.482] 
1.9017 
[.593] 
2.4342 
[.487] 
2.5242 
[.471] 
.26459 
[.967] 
 
*sig. at the 5% level, **sig. at the 1% level 
 
                                                                               
The Leading Role of the Euro 
The leading role of the Euro is considered in two ways: first, following Jones and 
Leishman (2006) the Euro should add an extra cointegrating vector if added to the 
group of seven currencies considered for cointegration; second, the Euro could 
Granger-cause change in other currencies.  
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 Having found one cointegrating vector among the seven currencies before and 
two after August 2007, the null the addition of the Euro to the pre August 07 period 
produces one or fewer vectors is rejected. A likelihood ratio statistic of 171, reported 
in Table 7 > critical value of 132 indicates there are two vectors (but not three, 72 < 
102). The inference is that the Euro leads the other seven currencies in the long run. 
The same can be said of the post August period, where the null of two vectors is 
rejected in favour of three (105 > 102). Finding the Euro is a leading currency both 
before and after August 07 is consistent with Syriopoulos (2007) and suggests a stable 
relation that may be one through which contagion could be transmitted. 
 
Table 7 Tests for Additional Cointegrating Vectors with the Euro 
 1 CV 2 CV 3CV
To Aug 07 320.3746   171.2067   72.4633   
After Aug 07 284.0970   186.6748  105.8222   
Critical Values 166.1200   132.4500   102.5600   
    
 
By contrast with the long run, the short run reveals no leading role of the Euro. The 
Wald tests, reported in Table 8 fail to reveal any Granger-causality from the Euro to a 
single currency.  
 
Table 8 Granger-causality Test Results with the Euro 
 Czech Estonia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Poland Slovakia
To Aug 
07 
4.6533 
[.199] 
3.2911 
[.349] 
5.3368 
[.149] 
3.2995 
[.348] 
3.3799 
[.337] 
4.3660 
[.225] 
4.6148 
[.202] 
After Aug 
07 
3.3223 
[.345] 
2.5787 
[.461] 
1.4758 
[.688] 
2.5923 
[.459] 
3.1544 
[.368] 
2.8674 
[.413] 
3.1077 
[.375] 
 
 
The leading role of the Euro is confined to the long run. Unlike among the seven 
Central European currencies, the Euro’s influence on the region appears stable. These 
results are out of line with Gilmore and McManus (2002) who find no cointegration. 
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Although Syriopoulos (2007) finds one cointegrating vector this remains the case 
after the schism. This does not demonstrate contagion. Serwa and Bohl (2005) do not 
find contagion either across Eastern European markets. However, given the inclusion 
of two developed economy indices, Syriopoulos may have revealed a stable leading 
role of the Dax and S&P500. His short run results does not indicate an increase in the 
links between markets, and so not evidence of shift contagion in the fifth definition 
sense of Pericoli and Sbracia (2003). 
 
Conclusion 
The findings suggests that despite not being of the region directly concerned, the EU-
8 were subject to financial contagion, perhaps as a result of a banking sector that had 
strong cross-border links and possibly based on lack of information about EU-8 
markets. The assessment of shift contagion in the fifth definition sense of Pericoli and 
Sbracia (2003) was revealed both in the long and short runs when comparing the pre 
and post August 2007 periods. Given the volatility among currencies of smaller 
economies, the increased bonding, and targeting of the Euro, the scope for deflecting 
shocks through exchange rate adjustments was much reduced. The protected 2 year 
period of displaying financial rectitude via targeting the Euro before accession is 
considered may now appear a burden that the IMF is supporting indirectly. Perhaps, 
in the light of the regular crises that beset financial markets and how contagion 
appears to undermine the hope of self determination of a small economy, the EU 
should reconsider the entry requirements for the EU-8 still not approved to join the 
Euro. 
At the end of the study period the Slovakian Koruna was revalued and then 
granted permission to join the Euro in 2009 whilst the Forint was facing sustained 
 20
speculative pressure. Following offering an emergency package to Hungary of $25bn, 
the IMF set up a $100bn fund to support emerging economies weather the global 
credit crunch. If the EU continues to require convergence of economy with emerging 
markets to the standards expected of developed economies before currency accession 
to monetary union, research is needed explore how a record of financial rectitude can 
be demonstrated whilst recognising that contagion is more likely to affect those 
emerging markets with information deficiencies.   
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